How are California Fusion Centers Working With Local Law Enforcement Agencies on Situational Awareness Support?

With the explosion of surveillance data being harvested across many different sectors, fusion centers were built to consolidate the multiple streams of surveillance data into information-sharing hubs that include local, state, federal, and private entities. Each state has at least a primary fusion center but can also have other regional fusion centers focused on major metropolitan areas within the state. In California, the primary fusion center is the California State Threat Assessment Center and the state also has regional fusion centers: NCRIC (Northern California), CCIC/STAC (Sacramento), LAJRIC (Los Angeles), OCIAC (Orange County), and SDLEC (San Diego). 

Panel Discussion: Shotspotter Gun Detection Across The Country

In September 2023, anti-surveillance activists from across the country (Chicago, Portland, and Northern and Southern California) came together to discuss gunshot detection and leading manufacturer Shotspotter (now known as “SoundThinking”). The panel was hosted by POP Pasadena and featured Mohammed Tasajar from ACLU-Socal, Aje Amaechi from Freedom to Thrive in Portland, Ed Vogel from the Lucy Parsons Lab in Chicago and Tracy Rosenberg from Oakland Privacy.

You can watch the coversation here!

San Leandro Delays Expansion of ALPR Program

The San Leandro City Council voted 4-3 to reject, for now, a police proposal to double the number of license plate readers in the East Bay town from 41 to 82. The initial 41 were approved in 2022, but just recently were fully installed,

The Council discussion was lengthy (over an hour and a half). We have pulled a few video clips with particularly interesting Q+A below.

CVE/PVE/TVTP: What’s The Latest Version of Homeland Security Terrorism Prevention Programs?

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), a program developed by the Obama administration, sought to combat radicalization, then defined almost entirely as Muslim-based violent extremism, through using schools and social service agencies to “identify” potential terrorists based on somewhat poorly defined characteristics. The program drew significant opposition on several fronts, including the vague indicators of incipient terrorism, the community-destroying elements of reporting and mutual suspicion, and the criminalization of innocuous behavior.

Versions of CVE continued to circulate through the Homeland Security apparatus, including Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), a state copycat version that was defunded, TVTP (Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention) and the Bay Area UASI (Urban Areas Security Initiative), whose then-law enforcement training program Urban Shield heavily featured exercises illustrating attacks by Islamic extremists. (Urban Shield was discontinued).

In the post-Urban Shield environment, the training program from Bay Area UASI, called BATEP, is undergoing some changes. The somewhat sparse website is here. Oakland Privacy volunteer Devyn Nordstrom decided to check out a free workshop on Terrorist Use of the Internet. The class materials can be seen here.

A summary of the evolution of the terrorism prevention programs over the past decade by Devyn can be read below.

The Pursuit of Folly: ALPRs as a Technological Non-Solution to Crime.

The Berkeley City Council is scheduled to vote on July 25th to install hundreds of thousands of dollars of Automated License Plate Reader equipment (ALPRs) across Berkeley, in the hope of deterring auto thefts and violent crime.

The proposal specifies a two year test period for the equipment, but fails to specify any parameters or methodology for the test, nor any criteria for success or failure. As such, this will not be a scientific test, it is flimflam, smoke-and-mirrors: a procedure that guarantees “success” defined after-the-fact regardless of reality.

But this is not the worst of it. A massive, nationwide test of ALPR efficacy has already been conducted, spanning the last decades.  And it failed.

On World Press Freedom Day: Open Letter on Protecting Encryption

As organizations that believe in the power of the right of privacy as an enabler of free speech and freedom of the press, we call on all governments to:

  • Ensure that encryption is not being undermined via overreaching legislative initiatives.
  • Ensure that technologies providing secure, encrypted services are not being blocked or throttled.
  • Revisit any bills, laws and policies that legitimise undermining encryption or blocking access to services offering encrypted communication, particularly the Surveillance Legislation Amendment Act in Australia, the EARN IT Act in the US, the Online Safety Bill in the UK, Bill C26 in Canada, India’s Directions 20(3)/2022 – CERT-In and the proposed version of the rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse in the EU.

Read the full letter here.